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SURVEY OF DAMAGES MEASURES RECOGNIZED IN
NEGLIGENCE CASES INVOLVING ANIMALS
ALISON M. ROWE
I. INTRODUCTION
Human beings form strong emotional bonds with a broad array of
living creatures ranging from traditional household pets such as dogs and
cats to other animals such as horses,' birds, and sheep. As a result of these
bonds, many people regard animals differently than inanimate objects.
Surveys have found that between 70% and 99% of pet owners,
encompassing 50% of U.S. households, consider their pets to be members
of their families.2
For sound policy reasons, courts have traditionally limited damages
in cases where an animal is negligently lost or destroyed to the market or
economic value of the animal.3 This system has resulted in low and
predictable costs for veterinary services and other animal-related products
and services.4 However, some people believe owners ought to be
compensated for their emotional suffering when a companion animal is
destroyed or injured due to negligence because of the strong emotional
attachment that they feel towards their companion animals.5 Accordingly,
advocates of change to the traditional damages rules in animal-related cases
have encouraged courts and legislatures to depart from established law and
award non-economic damages in negligence cases involving animals.6 One
recent trend in companion animal cases involves attempts by plaintiffs to
recover emotion-based damages in the form of "intrinsic" or "sentimental"
value damages in states where these alternate damages measures have been
* Alison M. Rowe practices law at the Fort Worth, Texas law firm of Kelly Hart & Hallman
LLP. Her practice includes the representation of clients in equine, appellate, and litigation matters. She
assisted in teh representation of the petitioner in Stricklandv. Medlen, 397 S.W.3d 184 (Tex. 2013).
1 Many horse owners consider their horse a companion animal, even in instances where the
horse is also being used for sport or work. See generally Susan J. Hankin, Not A Living Room Sofa:
Changing the Legal Status of Companion Animals, 4 RUTGERS J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 314 (2007); see also
Fackler v. Genetzky, 595 N.W.2d 884, 891-92 (Neb. 1999) (involving owners of racehorses who sought
damages for their emotional distress based on a veterinarian's alleged negligent destruction of horses).
2 See Elizabeth C. Hirschman, Consumers and Their Animal Companions, 20 J. Cons. Res.
616 (1994); see also ROD PREECE & LORNA CHAMBERLAIN, ANIMAL WELFARE & HUMAN VALUES 242
(1993).
See Victor E. Schwartz & Emily J. Laird, Non-Economic Damages in Pet Litigation: The
Serious Need to Preserve a Rational Rule, PEPP. L. REv. 227, 229 (2006) [hereinafter Non-Economic
Damages in Pet Litigation].
Id. at 261-67.
Id. at 243-44.
6 id.
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judicially recognized for personal property having little or no market value.
This article will explore that trend in detail.
Proponents of current law, including many animal service
providers, veterinarians, and animal owner and breeder organizations, argue
that allowing the recovery of emotional damages in ordinary negligence
cases would lead to potentially astronomical and unpredictable damage
awards. They argue these awards would result in negative consequences for
everyone involved' and ultimately affect the quality and costs of services to
animals and their owners.
This article will first articulate the various ways in which courts
and legislatures have resolved negligence cases involving plaintiffs seeking
emotion-based damages for harm done to their companion animals.9
Second, this article will provide an overview of the public policy issues
surrounding recovery for emotional damages in tort cases involving
animals. Finally, this article will explain how allowing non-economic
damages in companion animal cases involving mere negligence would be
unsound public policy and an unwise departure from established law.
II. CATEGORIES OF TORT LAW DAMAGES
Plaintiffs in the animal tort cases discussed in this article frame
their claims under a number of different damages theories. Therefore, to
fully understand the actions of different courts in this genre of cases, it is
important to understand the purpose of the basic types of damages
recoverable in the tort system.
A. Basic Types of Tort Law Damages
The two fundamental types of tort damages are compensatory and
punitive damages. Compensatory damages are "intended to represent the
closest possible financial equivalent of the loss or harm suffered by the
plaintiff, to make the plaintiff whole again, [and] to restore the plaintiff to
the position the plaintiff was in before the tort occurred."'o Compensatory
7 For an example of how much litigation might be generated, consider that motorists kill
more than 1 million dogs and 5 million cats annually. Merritt Clifton, Roadkill Avoidance Tips from
Animal People, ANIMAL PEOPLE (May 16, 2001),
http://www.animalpeoplenews.org/IMPORTANTMATS/roadkillsTips.htm.
8 See generally Non-Economic Damages in Pet Litigation, supra note 3, at 260-67.
9 The vast majority of cases involving injury or destruction of animals involve ordinary or
professional negligence. Accordingly, this article focuses on those cases and not claims involving
intentional or malicious conduct, for which additional damages theories may be applicable. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 47 cmt. m (2012);
see also infra note 30.
10 See Non-Economic Damages in Pet Litigation, supra note 3, at 230 (citing Victor E.
Schwartz, et al., PROSSER, WADE & SCHWARTZ'S TORTS 519 (10th ed. 2000)).
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damages include both economic and non-economic damages." Economic
damages compensate plaintiffs for injuries that can be objectively
measured.12 Non-economic damages compensate plaintiffs for intangible,
subjective injuries, such as mental anguish, loss of companionship, and
emotional distress. 3 Both forms of compensatory damages are intended to
compensate the plaintiff, not to punish the tortfeasor. 4
In contrast, punitive damages are an amount greater than a
quantification of the harm suffered." Punitive damages are intended to
punish a defendant for his or her conduct to deter similar conduct in the
future.' 6 Punitive damages are typically only available where a plaintiff
proves the defendant's conduct involved a degree of outrage similar to that
usually found in crime.'7 The conduct is considered outrageous when the
defendant's acts are done with an evil motive or with such reckless
indifference to the rights of others that they merit punishment.'" Punitive
damages are not awarded for mere mistakes or errors of judgment.' 9
B. Tort Law Damages for Injury to or Destruction ofPersonal Property
Traditionally, damages for injury to or destruction of personal
property have been awarded based on the value of the property.20 Most
jurisdictions use the market value of the property when calculating
damages.2' In making such calculations, courts generally define market
value as "what the property in question could probably have been sold for
on the open market, in the ordinary course of voluntary sale by a leisurely
seller to a willing buyer." 22
Generally, non-economic damages are not recoverable in cases in
which a plaintiff claims an emotion-based injury because of harm to
personal property as a result of negligence. 23 There are several public policy
concerns underlying this general rule, including lack of foreseeability and
the subjective and easily inflatable nature of emotion-based claims
24involving property.
" Id.
12 Id.
13 id.
15 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: REMEDIES § 908, cmt. b (1979).
16 See Non-Economic Damages in Pet Litigation, supra note 3, at 23 1.
" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: REMEDIES § 908, cmt. b (1979).
8 Id.
19 See Non-Economic Damages in Pet Litigation, supra note 3, at 235-36 (citing Victor E.
Schwartz, et al., PROSSER, WADE & SCHWARTZ'S TORTS 519 (10th ed. 2000)).20 Id. at 232; see discussion infra Part V.A-C.
21 See discussion infra Part V.A-B.
22 See Schwartz, supra note 6, at 547.
23 See Non-Economic Damages in Pet Litigation, supra note 3, at 232; see also discussion
infra Part 111.
24 Non-Economic Damages in Pet Litigation, supra note 3, at 232.
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III. GENERALLY No LIABILITY FOR NON-EcoNOMIC DAMAGES IN
ORINDARY NEGLIGENCE CASES INVOLVING ANIMALS
As discussed previously, non-economic damages are usually not
available for negligent harm to personal property.2 5 This general principal is
applicable to both cases in which the plaintiff seeks to include emotional
harms in the calculation of damages and those cases in which the plaintiff
sues under a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress.26
Consistent with these principles, the majority of states refuse to recognize a
damages claim for the negligent loss of an animal based on an owner's
emotional attachment. Courts in thirty-four states have expressly refused to
award such damages.2 7 Although many of these courts recognize the strong
emotions that owners feel towards their companion animals, courts
typically reject claims derived from an owner's emotional attachment on
public policy grounds, reasoning that such damages are inherently
subjective and therefore easily inflatable.
The Restatement (Third) of Torts, published by the American Law
Institute, has recently addressed the recoverability of emotion-based
damages arising from damage to pets.28 The Restatement explains:
While pets are often quite different from other chattels in
terms of emotional attachment, an actor who negligently
injures another's pet is not liable for emotional harm
suffered by the pet's owner. This rule against liability for
emotional harm due to injury to a pet limits the liability of
veterinarians in the event of malpractice and serves to
make veterinary services more readily available for pets.
Although harm to pets (and chattels with sentimental value)
can cause real and serious emotional harm in some cases,
lines-arbitrary at times-that limit recovery for emotional
harm are necessary. Indeed, injury to a close personal
friend may cause serious emotional harm, but that harm is
similarly not recoverable under this Chapter. However,
recovery for intentionally inflicted emotional harm is not
barred when the defendant's method of inflicting harm is
by means of causing harm to property, including an
animal.29
25 See discussion supra at Part H.B.
26 See Non-Economic Damages in Pet Litigation, supra note 3, at 235-36; see also infra
Table 1.
27 See infra Table 1.
28 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 47
cmt. m (2012).
29 Id. (emphasis in original).
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As the Restatement (Third) of Torts explains, malice or intentional conduct
is required to recover for emotional harm resulting from damage to
property, including damage to animals. 3 0 This article does not address
trespass or conversion cases, two areas in which recovery for emotional
harm has received more liberal treatment.
IV. A MINORITY OF JURISDICTIONS HAVE RECOGNIZED LIABILITY FOR
EMOTIONAL HARM IN NEGLIGENCE CASES INVOLVING DAMAGE TO
ANIMALS
Appellate courts in a minority of jurisdictions, including
Arkansas,32 Hawaii," Florida,34 Louisiana, 5 and Texas, 6 have recognized
the recoverability of emotion-based damages caused by negligent injury to
animals. Despite the existence of a few cases allowing recovery for such
damages, the overwhelming majority of courts have been reluctant to award
damages for mental harm arising from injury to chattel caused by mere
37negligence.
30 See Plotnik v. Meihaus, 146 Cal. Rptr. 3d 585, 601 (Cal Ct. App. 2012) (holding emotional
distress damages recoverable on "trespass to personal property" claim involving intentional striking of
dog with a bat); La Porte v. Associated Independents, Inc., 163 So. 2d 267, 269 (Fla. 1964) (noting an
owner's affection for dog may be considered in case involving malicious killing of tethered dog by
garbage collector); Brown v. Crocker, 139 So. 2d 779, 781 (La. Ct. App. 1962) (affirming recovery of
damages "for shock and mental anguish experienced" from death of mare and loss of stillborn foal as a
result of shooting); Womack v. Von Rardon, 135 P.3d 542, 546 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006) (recognizing rule
against recovery of emotional harm for negligent injury to pet, but allowing such recovery when there is
malicious injury, as occurred when defendant used gasoline to set plaintiff's cat on fire).
31 See Nnadili v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 435 F. Supp. 2d 93 (D.D.C. 2006); but see Lubner v.
City of Los Angeles, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 29-31 (Ct. App. 1996).
32 See McAdams v. Faulk, No. CA01-1350, 2002 WL 700956, at *5 (Ark. Ct. App. Apr. 24,
2002) (holding mental anguish damages are available in negligence cases involving personal property,
including dogs, and that punitive damages were available in veterinary malpractice actions).
3 See Campbell v. Animal Quarantine Station, 632 P.2d 1066, 1071 (Haw. 1981) (holding
damages for injured feelings and mental distress suffered through loss of family dog were proper items
of recovery in negligence case). The Hawaii legislature may have indirectly overruled Campbell by
barring damages for "negligent infliction of serious emotional distress or disturbance if the distress or
disturbance arises solely out of damage to property or material objects." HAw. REv. STAT. § 663-8.9
(West 1986).
34 See Knowles Animal Hosp., Inc. v. Wills, 360 So. 2d 37, 38-39 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978)
(stating that the trial court did not err by including for consideration of the jury the element of mental
pain and suffering of the owners of the dog in a veterinary negligence case), cert. denied, 368 So.2d
1369 (Fla. 1979).
35 See Barrios v. Safeway Ins. Co., 97 So. 3d 1019, 1024 (La. Ct. App. 2012) (affirming
award of emotion-based damages of $5,000 to each owner of dog negligently killed by motorist where
owners were nearby, arrived at the scene shortly thereafter, loved their animal, and suffered severe
emotional harm as a result of the dog's death).
36 See Medlen v. Strickland, 353 S.W.3d 576, 580-81 (Tex. Ct. App. 2011) (finding loss of a
pet dog's companionship may be recoverable as a component of the dog's intrinsic or sentimental
value), rev'd, Strickland v. Medlen, 397 S.W.3d 184 (Tex. 2013).
37 E.g., W.E. Shipley, Annotation, Recovery for Mental Shock or Distress in Connection with
Injury to or Interference with Tangible Property, 28 A.L.R. 2d 1070 (1953).
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V. MEASURES OF ECONOMIC DAMAGES IN CASES INVOLVING ANIMALS
In general, courts look at a variety of pecuniary factors in assessing
economic damages for injury to or the destruction of an animal.
Specifically, courts often consider the fair-market value of the animal itself,
particularly if it has significant market worth." For example, courts have
allowed expert witness testimony regarding an animal's pedigree, personal
characteristics, breeding potential, usefulness to its owner, and services
provided to its owner. Where an animal has no market value or the market
value cannot be ascertained, some jurisdictions have recognized alternate
valuation schemes for animals including "value to the owner" and, in rare
cases, sentimental value to the owner.
A. The General Rule: Market Value OfAnimal
In the majority of jurisdictions, courts have addressed the issue of
measuring damages for an animal that has been negligently destroyed by
limiting damages to the animal's fair market value at the time of its
destruction.40 Some jurisdictions also recognize the ability to recover other
economic damages, such as veterinary bills, even if they exceed the
3 Richard L. Cupp, Jr. & Amber E. Dean, Veterinarians in the Doghouse: Are Pet Suits
Economically Viable?, 16 THE BRIEF No.1 (2002).
3 See Wells v. Brown, 217 P.2d 995, 997-98 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1950) (finding testimony
by an expert familiar with the dog's breed sufficient with respect to the evidentiary burden on the
plaintiff to justify the jury verdict); see also Demeo v. Manville, 386 N.E.2d 917, 918-19 (Ill. App. Ct.
1979) (allowing the introduction of expert testimony pertaining to the dog's commercial value, qualities,
and loss of service).
40 See Naples v. Miller, No. 08C-01-093, 2009 WL 1163504, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 30,
2009) (holding that the maximum damages available to the plaintiff is his injured dog's market value;
past and future veterinary expenses are not recoverable to the extent they exceed the dog's value); Gill
v. Brown, 695 P.2d 1276, 1277 (Idaho Ct. App. 1985) (holding that damages are the fair market value of
a donkey at time of its destruction); Lachenman v. Stice, 838 N.E.2d 451, 467 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005)
(holding that damages are the fair market value of a dog at the time of destruction); Nichols v. Sukaro
Kennels, 555 N.W.2d 689, 691-92 (Iowa 1996) (rejecting the intrinsic value measure for a dog, holding
that the measure of damages is the amount which will return dog owner, monetarily, to the status he was
in before the loss); Kling v. U.S. Fire Insurance Company, 146 So.2d 635 at 642 (La. Ct. App. 1962)
(holding that a dog's value is the full market value of the dog, excluding personal or sentimental
considerations); Soucek v. Banham, 524 N.W.2d 478, 481 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (rejecting intrinsic
value to owner as a damages measure, holding that the fair market value of a dog is proper measure of
damages for a destroyed dog); Wright v. Edison, 619 S.W.2d 797, 802 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (holding
that damages are the difference between the fair market value of cats immediately before and
immediately after the alleged injury); Shera v. N.C. State Univ. Veterinary Teaching Hosp., 723 S.E.2d
352, 357 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012) (rejecting an actual value measure of damages for a dog, holding that the
market value measure of damages applies to the negligent destruction of the dog); Daughen v. Fox, 539
A.2d 858, 864 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (holding that the measure of damages is the value of a dog prior to
its destruction; sentimental attachment does not make a dog "unique chattel" under PA law); Goodby v.
Vetpharm, Inc., 974 A.2d 1269, 1272 (Vt. 2009) (holding that the measure of damages is the fair market
value of cats prior to death less fair market value of cats after death); Kondaurov v. Kerdasha, 629
S.E.2d 181, 186 (Va. 2006) (holding that the measure of damages is the diminution in value of dog
resulting from negligence, plus reasonable and necessary expenses incurred).
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animal's market value, when the plaintiff can show that such damages were
occasioned by the defendant's tortious conduct. Cases recognizing the
recoverability of economic damages exceeding an animal's market value
typically involve scenarios where an animal has been injured but not
completely lost or destroyed.4 1
B. A Second Approach: "Value to the Owner" Standard for Animals With
No Market Value
Courts in a number of jurisdictions, including Alaska,42
California,4 3 Illinois," Mississippi,45 New Mexico,46 Texas, 4 7 Washington,48
and West Virginia,4 9 recognize a "value to the owner" standard. Courts use
this standard to derive the economic or pecuniary value of goods where
there is no market value or the market value is not ascertainable, and where
the goods have identifiable features that do not enter into exchange value
41 See Martinez v. Robledo, 147 Cal. Rptr. 3d 921, 927 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012) (holding that pet
owners may recover reasonable costs of treatment as damages for injury to pet, even where such
damages exceed pet's market value); Burgess v. Shampooch Pet Indus., Inc., 131 P.3d 1248, 1252 (Kan.
Ct. App. 2006) (affirming award of reasonable and necessary veterinary expenses to restore dog with no
market value to prior health, where dog groomer negligently caused dog's dislocated hip); Hyland v.
Borras, 719 A.2d 662, 664 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998) (affirming an award of $2,500 for
veterinary treatment, cost of supplemental dietary pills, and travel expenses incurred to restore shih-tzu
to prior condition, although cost of new shih-tzu was only $500).
42 See Mitchell v. Heinrichs, 27 P.3d 309, 313-14 (Alaska 2001) (holding that the actual
value to owner excludes sentimental value).
1 See McMahon v. Craig, 97 Cal. Rptr. 3d 555, 566-67 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that
the peculiar value to the owner refers to a dog's unique economic value, not its sentimental or emotional
value).
44 See Jankoski v. Preiser Animal Hosp., Ltd., 510 N.E.2d 1084, 1087 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987)
(holding that the actual value to the owner may include some element of sentimental value).
4 See Hodges v. Causey, 26 So. 945, 946 (Miss. 1900) (holding that the special or pecuniary
value of a dog to its owner is to be ascertained by reference to the dog's usefulness and services).
46 See Wilcox v. Butt's Drug Stores, 35 P.2d 978, 979 (N.M. 1934) (holding that the special
value of dog to owner does not include sentimental value).
4 See Heiligmann v. Rose, 16 S.W. 931 (Tex. 1891); Mireles v. Mormon, No. 03-09-00451-
CV, 2010 WL 3059241, at *17 (Tex. App., Aug. 6, 2010) (holdingthat damages for the loss ofa dog are
limited to either the market value, if one can be ascertained, or some special or pecuniary economic
value to its owner that is derived from the dog's usefulness and services); Petco Animal Supplies, Inc. v.
Schuster, 144 S.W.3d 554 (Tex. App. 2004) (holding similarly to Mireles v. Mormon, No. 03-09-00451-
CV, 2010 WL 3059241); Zeid v. Pearce, 953 S.W.2d 368 (Tex. App. 1997); Bueckner v. Hamel, 886
S.W.2d 368 (Tex. App 1994); see also Rowe v. Watkins, 324 S.W.3d 111 (Tex. App. 2010) (holding
that the measure of damages is a dog's actual worth or value less sentimental considerations); Young's
Bus Lines, Inc. v. Redmon, 43 S.W.2d 266 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931) ( holding that in the absence of
market value, the measure of damages for loss of dog is the "intrinsic or actual" value to dog owner;
evidence of sentimental value is inadmissible).
48 See, e.g., Sherman v. Kissinger, 195 P.3d 539, 547-48 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008) (stating that
when market value could not be determined that the appropriate measure was value to owner or intrinsic
value, excluding sentimental value).
49 Carbasho v. Musulin, 618 S.E.2d 368, 370-71 (W. Va. 2005) (holding that in determining
market value, pecuniary value, or some special value of a dog, sentimental value and mental suffering
cannot be considered).
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but do make the goods more valuable to their owner than to others.so
Section 911 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts identifies personal
records, family portraits, and "dog[s] trained to obey only one master" as
examples of items that have little value to others than the owner, and cases
where "it would be unjust to limit the damages for destroying or harming
,51the articles to the exchange value." In such cases, the value to the owner
may be awarded.52 California has codified Section 911 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, and at least one California court has applied it as the
measure of economic damages for an animal having no market value.53 The
terminology used for the value to the owner standards approved in
California and other jurisdictions includes intrinsic, actual, peculiar, and
special value.
The authors of the Restatement (Second) of Torts distinguish
property's value to the owner from property's sentimental value to its
owner. Sentiment cannot form a basis for the "peculiar value to the owner":
Even when the subject matter has its chief value in its value
for use by the injured person, if the thing is replaceable, the
damages for its loss are limited to replacement value, less
an amount for depreciation . . . If the subject matter cannot
be replaced, however, as in the case of a destroyed or lost
family portrait, the owner will be compensated for its
special value to him, as evidenced by the original cost, and
the quality and condition at the time of the loss. Likewise
an author who with great labor has compiled a manuscript,
useful to him but with no exchange value, is entitled, in
case of its destruction, to the value of the time spent in
producing it or necessary to spend to reproduce it. In these
cases, however, damages cannot be based on sentimental
value.54
Generally, the value to the owner measure is an alternative method
of deriving the economic value of the animal in the absence of a market
value. Most jurisdictions allowing a "value to the owner" measure do not
allow recovery for the value of the animal as a companion, the animal's
sentimental value, or any other emotion-based value schemes to be included
50 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 911, cmt. e (1979).
5 1 Id.
52 Id.
5 McMahon v. Craig, 97 Cal. Rptr. 3d 555, 566-67 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (citing the
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 911 and holding that a dog's "peculiar value" when determining its
actual value to the owner does not include sentimental or emotional value).
54 Id. (emphasis supplied).
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in an economic damages award.55 The majority rule is based upon both
longstanding property damages principles and sound public policy. As
discussed in the next section, only two intermediate appellate courts in the
nation have departed from established law and held that sentimental value
or the loss of an animal's companionship are factors that may be considered
when determining the value to the owner. One of those courts was
subsequently overruled.
C. Economic Damages for Sentimental Value ofAnimal
Most states do not recognize the recovery of sentimental value for
any type of personal property. Thus, the majority of courts in jurisdictions
that have addressed the recoverability of sentimental value damages for an
animal reject such damages.
However, a handful of states have recognized a sentimental value
damages measure for items of almost purely sentimental value, such as
keepsakes or heirlooms. Only two courts in these states have considered
the applicability of this sentimental value measure to animals. In
Lachenman v. Stice, the Indiana Court of Appeals expressly held that the
ss See supra notes 42-49.
56 Mitchell v. Heinrichs, 27 P.3d 309, 314 (Alaska 2001) (holding that a dog owner may not
recover damages for her dog's sentimental value as a component of actual value to owner); Lachenman
v. Stice, 838 N.E.2d 451, 467-68 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (refusing to extend the holdings of Indiana
heirloom cases to allow for recovery of the sentimental value of a dog); Kling v. U.S. Fire Insurance
Company, 146 So.2d 635 at 642 (La. Ct. App. 1962) (holding that, pursuant to the law of Louisiana,
personal or sentimental considerations cannot be considered in valuing a Toy Fox Terrier or other
personalty); Wilcox v. Butt's Drug Stores, 35 P.2d 978, 979 (N.M. 1934) (holding that under New
Mexico law the value to owner of a negligently destroyed dog is based on actual damages sustained by
being deprived of dog, not including "sentimental or fanciful value"); Shera v. N.C. State Univ.
Veterinary Teaching Hosp., 723 S.E.2d 352, 356-57 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012) (stating sentimental value of
negligently destroyed dog is not recoverable); Goodby v. Vetpharm, Inc., 974 A.2d 1269, 1274 (Vt.
2009) (holding that Vermont law does not allow for recovery for sentimental loss not recognized for
personal property, including cats); Kondaurov v. Kerdasha, 629 S.E.2d 181, 187 n.5 (Va. 2006) (holding
that the sentimental value and peculiar value of negligently destroyed personalty, including dogs, is not
recoverable under the law of Virginia); Sherman v. Kissinger, 195 P.3d 539, 548 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008)
(holding that the owner has no right to recovery for emotional distress arising from the negligent death
to or injury of a pet); Carbasho v. Musulin, 618 S.E.2d 368, 371 (W. Va. 2005) (holding that damages
for sentimental value are not recoverable for the death of a pet dog under West Virgina law).
5 Campins v. Capels, 461 N.E.2d 712, 720-21 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984) (holding an owner's
feelings and sentimental value could be taken into consideration when valuing "items of almost purely
sentimental value," especially those items won or generated by "blood, sweat, and tears"); Bateman v.
Ryder, 64 S.W.48, 48-49 (Tenn. 1901) (holding that in an action for trover of trunk that contained,
among other items, pictures and manuscripts of plaintiffs deceased husband it was appropriate for a
jury to consider evidence of plaintiffs relation to the property and to award damages beyond the actual
value of the property if the conversion of the property caused a special loss or injury); Brown v. Frontier
Theatres, Inc., 369 S.W.2d 299, 304-305 (Tex. 1963) (holding that in awarding damages for destroyed
property whose primary value was sentimental, it is necessary to take into account the owners' feelings
for the destroyed property); Harvey v. Wheeler Transfer & Storage Co., 277 N.W. 627, 629 (Wis. 1938)
(holding that in awarding damages for destroyed property that is chiefly or exclusively of value to its
owner, such as keepsakes, family pictures, and the like, that the measure of damages should take into
consideration the owner's feelings for the destroyed property).
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sentimental value damages measure recognized for keepsakes in Indiana
did not apply to a pet dog. Conversely, a Texas intermediate Court of
Appeals held in Medlen v. Strickland that the sentimental value measure in
heirloom cases does apply to dogs and can reflect the value of the dog's
companionship and the attachment an owner feels toward his or her beloved
family pet." Medlen was subsequently reversed on appeal to the Supreme
Court of Texas.o
While not expressly addressing a sentimental value damages
measure, an intermediate appellate court in Illinois stated in the dicta of
Jankoski v. Preiser Animal Hosp., Ltd that a dog's actual value to its owner
may include some element of sentimental value, though damages in such
cases are "severely circumscribed." 61 Medlen and Jankoski are the only two
appellate court decisions in the nation known to the author at the time of
this article that have held that an animal's sentimental value might be
recoverable as economic damages.
The court of appeals' holding in Medlen was in conflict with a
Texas Supreme Court decision from 1891, Heiligmann v. Rose, holding that
the "true rule" for determining the value of dogs is "either a market value, if
the dog has any, or some special or pecuniary value to the owner, that may
be ascertained by reference to the usefulness and services of the dog." 62 The
Medlen holding was also in conflict with the decisions of other Texas courts
of appeals that, consistent with Heiligmann, repeatedly held that damages
for the loss of a dog with no market value are limited to the actual or
pecuniary value of the dog to the owner excluding sentimental
considerations.63
The Medlen court dismissed the controlling precedent in
Heiligmann as "timeworn" because, it reasoned, the sentimental value
measure for irreplaceable heirlooms and the intrinsic value measure for
other property had developed at common law since the case was decided. 4
The Medlen court supported its holding with the rationale that recovery for
sentimental damages is now allowed under Texas law for "all types of
personal property" and should also be allowed for pets. 6 5 The Court of
Appeals conflated the concepts of intrinsic value and sentimental value,66
s8 Lachenman, 838 N.E.2d at 467-68 (refusing to extend the holdings of Indiana heirloom
cases to allow for recovery of the sentimental value of a dog).
5 See Medlen v. Strickland, 353 S.W.3d 576, 580-81 (Tex. Ct. App. 2011).
60 Strickland v. Medlen, 397 S.W.3d 184 (Tex. 2013).
61 See Jankoski v. Preiser Animal Hosp., Ltd., 510 N.E.2d 1084, 1086-87 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987).
62 Heiligmann v. Rose, 16 S.W. 931 (Tex. 1891).
63 See Mireles v. Mormon, 2010 WL 3059241 (Tex. App., Aug. 6, 2010); Rowe v. Watkins,
324 S.W.3d Ill (Tex. App. 2010); Petco Animal Supplies, Inc. v. Schuster, 144 S.W.3d 554 (Tex. App.
2004); Zeid v. Pearce, 953 S.W.2d 368 (Tex. App. 1997); Bueckner v. Hamel, 886 S.W.2d 368 (Tex.
App. 1994); Young's Bus Lines, Inc. v. Redmon, 43 S.W.2d 266 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931).
6 Medlen v. Strickland, 353 S.W.3d at 580.
6 Id.
6 Strickland v. Medlen, 397 S.W.3d 184, 189-90 (Tex. 2013).
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and by doing so failed to address a longstanding general rule that damage to
personal property having no market value is measured by the actual
economic worth of the property to the owner excluding sentimental
considerations. By holding that a dog's sentimental value is recoverable, the
Medlen court (had it not been reversed on appeal) would have created an
expansive new rule for measuring the value of a dog that would allow the
owner to recover unlimited damages derived from the emotional bond
between an animal and its owner.
The Supreme Court of Texas overturned Medlen, reaffirming that
pets are legally classified as property, and that non-economic damages
rooted in subjective feelings are inappropriate in negligence cases, no
matter how beloved the animal.67 In reversing the Medlen decision, the
Supreme Court of Texas clarified that the "special value" referenced in
Heiligmann is derived from the dog's economic, not emotional, attributes.
Pets are not the equivalent of heirlooms, which are kept only for sentiment;
pets provide current benefits that can be quantified as their special value to
the owner without awarding damages for subjective feelings. 6 9 To
recognize damages based on sentiment would effectively create a common-
law loss of companionship claim for companion animals. 70 The Supreme
Court of Texas set forth in Strickland the compelling pet welfare and social-
policy reasons that counsel against permitting such a claim, including "the
anomaly of elevating 'man's best friend' over multiple valuable human
relationships" 7' and "the open-ended nature of such liability."72 The Court
noted that the Texas legislature is better equipped to decide whether
extending wrongful-death actions to pets is in the State's best interest, and
if so, to structure an appropriate remedy.73
D. Damages For Loss of Companionship ofAnimal
Plaintiffs in animal tort cases have sought damages for loss of
companionship with an animal both as an independent cause of action and
as an element of the animal's value. However, the vast majority of
jurisdictions reject damages for an owner's loss of companionship with his
or her animal regardless of whether the plaintiff sought damages as an
67 Id. at 185-86.
61 Id. at 188-89.
6
1 Id. at 190-91.
'
0 Id. 191-92.
71 Id. at 195 (noting that loss-of-consortium damages are not available in Texas if siblings,
step-children, grandparents, or close human friends are negligently killed).
7 Id. at 195-96("Such broad, unstructured liability would invite peculiar results ... for
example, if a Westminster best-of-breed champion with a $20,000 market value is negligently
destroyed, that would be the owner's top-end recovery. But if a 15-year-old frail dog with no market
value dies, the owner could sue for unlimited emotional-injury damages.").
7 Id. at 197.
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independent cause of action or as an element of the animal's value.74 The
majority of jurisdictions have denied recovery for loss of companionship
with a pet due to public policy concerns that will be discussed in more
detail. In addition, loss of companionship damages are severely restricted
under state laws, which typically require the victim of the tortious conduct
to be a close human family member.76
Medlen v. Strickland, which was later reversed by the Supreme
Court of Texas, is the only appellate court decision in the nation known to
the author in which a court held that a pet owner may recover loss of
companionship as a component of the pet's intrinsic or sentimental value to
the owner. Brousseau v. Rosenthal,8 a court opinion out of New York,
has been cited by plaintiffs in various cases for the proposition that loss of
companionship is a component of property value when establishing the
actual value of a dog. Brousseau, however, is the opinion of a small claims
trial court.79 Every New York appellate court decision on this issue that the
74 Mitchell v. Heinrichs, 27 P.3d 309, 312-14 (Alaska 2001) (listing a series of factors Alaska
courts may use to determine the actual value to the dog owner that does not include companionship);
Kaufman v. Langhofer, 222 P.3d 272, 277-79 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that damages for loss of
companionship are not recoverable for the death of a pet bird under loss of consortium or negligent
inflection of emotional distress theories under Arizona law); McMahon v. Craig, 97 Cal. Rptr. 3d 555,
566-67 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that a dog's "peculiar value" when determining its actual value to
the owner does not include sentimental or emotional value under California law); Jankoski v. Preiser
Animal Hosp., Ltd., 510 N.E.2d 1084, 1087 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (stating that an action for the loss of
companionship of a dog is not recognized under Illinois law); Krasnecky v. Meffen, 777 N.E.2d 1286,
1289-1290 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002) (holding that damages for loss of companionship to a sheep was not
within the language of the Massachusetts wrongful statute); Koester v. VCA Animal Hosp., 624
N.W.2d 209, 211 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000) (determining recovery for loss of companionship to a dog
would require the creation of a new cause of action under Michigan law, a matter in which the court
defers to legislature); Harabes v. The Barkery, 791 A.2d 1142, 1145 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001)
(stating that practical reasons and public policy considerations prevent recovery of loss of
companionship for dog under New Jersey law); DeJoy v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 786 N.Y.S.2d
873, 873 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004) (holding under New York law owners could not recover for emotional
distress suffered because of the death of horses, precluding the owners' claims for recovery for loss of
companionship to a horse, which is legally equivalent); Lewis v. Di Donna, 743 N.Y.S.2d 186, 189
(N.Y. App. Div. 2002) (holding that a lower New York court erred in allowing a dog owner to present
proof of loss of companionship as part of determining a dog's value); Oberschlake v. Veterinary Assoc.
Animal Hosp., 785 N.E.2d 811, 815 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003) (holding that loss of companionship to
animals was not recoverable under Ohio law); Daughen v. Fox, 539 A.2d 858, 865 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988)
("[u]nder no circumstances, under the law of Pennsylvania, may there be recovery for loss of
companionship due to the death of an animal."); Goodby v. Vetpharm, Inc., 974 A.2d 1269, 1273 (Vt.
2009) (denying recovery for loss of companionship to cats because such recovery would represent a
dramatic alteration to Vermont law best left to the legislature); Sherman v. Kissinger, 195 P.3d 539, 548
(Wash. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that owner has no right of recovery for loss of companionship to a dog
under Washington law); Carbasho v. Musulin, 618 S.E.2d 368, 370-71 (W. Va. 2005) (holding that loss
of dog's companionship is not recoverable under West Virginia law).
7 See discussion infra Parts V, VI.
76 See Non-Economic Damages in Pet Litigation, supra note 3, at 254-57.
" See Medlen v. Strickland, 353 S.W.3d 576, 580-81 (Tex. Ct. App. 2011).
7 Brousseau v. Rosenthal, 443 N.Y.S.2d 285, 286 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1980).
7 Brousseau, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 286 (opinion of "Civil Court, City of New York, New York
County" deciding "small claims action"); see also N.Y. CITY CIV. CT. ACT, §§ 201-207 (defining
jurisdiction of New York City Civil Court to include civil cases involving amounts up to $25,000, small
claims matters not exceeding $5,000, and landlord-tenant matters).
NEGLIGENCE CASES INVOLVING ANIMALS
author has located indicates that damages for loss of companionship with an
animal are not recoverable under New York law.s0
VI. STATES WITH STATUTORILY DEFINED DAMAGES FOR CASES
INVOLVING COMPANION ANIMALS
The legislatures of Maryland and Tennessee have enacted statutes
defining and limiting non-economic damages in pet tort cases sounding in
negligence.8' At least one commentator has suggested that a legislative
limitation on damages in these cases is not a good compromise, chiefly
because damages caps can be struck down as unconstitutional, allowing a
"foot in the door" for an expansion of damages and the recognition of
unlimited non-economic damages claims. 82
VII. THE ADVERSE PUBLIC POLICY CONSEQUENCES OF ALLOWING NON-
ECONOMIC DAMAGES IN ANIMAL-RELATED NEGLIGENCE SUITS
There seems to be no unanimous "pro-pet" position on the issue of
whether the law should be expanded to allow emotion-based damages for
companion animals. Organizations committed to animal well-being are
arrayed on both sides.83 However, if the Strickland case -in which
numerous animal-welfare organizations filed amicus briefs - is any
indicator of a national consensus, the vast majority of pet-friendly groups
oppose an expansion of emotion-based damages, lest greater liability raise
the cost of animal ownership and ultimately cause animals more harm than
good.84
Those who support an expansion of emotion-based damages in
animal negligence cases proffer spirited arguments in opposition to current
law.85 Generally, they argue that compensating the owner for the market or
economic value of a companion animal reflects neither the loss suffered by
so See Lewis v. Di Donna, 743 N.Y.S.2d 186 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002) (deciding a dog owner
was not allowed to present proof of loss of companionship of her dog with respect to the issue of
damages); see also DeJoy v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 786 N.Y.S.2d 873 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004)
(affirming dismissal of claim for damages for "loss of companionship and bond between horse and
owner"); Whitmore v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 786 N.Y.S.2d 762 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004); Shrage
v. Hatzlacha Cab Corp., 788 N.Y.S.2d 4 (N.Y.App. Div. 2004) (affirming dismissal of claims for dog
owner's emotional injury arising from negligent killing of dog, including loss of companionship).
8' MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 11-110(b)(1), (2) (West 2012) (limits damages to
fair market value plus necessary costs of veterinary care, not to exceed $7,500 total); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 44-17-403(a)(1) (West 2012) (allowing non-economic damages of up to $5,000 in ordinary negligence
cases, if the pet's death or fatal injury occurs on the property of the owner; excludes certain entities and
individuals, such as veterinarians and animal shelters).
82 Non-Economic Damages in Pet Litigation, supra note 3, at 269-72.
83 Strickland v. Medlen, 397 S.W.3d 184, 193 (Tex. 2013).
8 Id.
8 See John Diamond, Rethinking Compensation for Mental Distress: A Critique of the
Restatement (Third) §§ 45-47, 16 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & LAW 141, 151-63 (2008).
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nor the value to the owner, and they argue that it also fails to account for
society's recognition of a companion animal's value. 6 The economic value
of a companion animal such as a mixed-breed dog may be so low that it is
not worth bringing an action at all, even in cases of clear injustice.87
Proponents of emotion-based damages claim that allowing increased
liability in negligence cases will deter careless actions." Finally, some
argue that it is unjust for the veterinary industry to profit from substantial
emotional investment in pets while also benefiting from laws that do not
recognize full compensation for emotional loss when an animal is injured or
destroyed due to negligence.89 Although it might lead to greater malpractice
liability, they also argue that recognizing a legal status for pets would
ultimately raise the prestige of the veterinary profession.90
While these arguments certainly have some validity - and nobody
can deny the grief that a pet owner feels when his or her animal is
negligently destroyed - the author sides with proponents of current law
and the decisions of the vast majority of the courts in the nation. As the
Supreme Court of Texas wisely observed, "an inconvenient, but
inescapable truth" remains: "Tort law . . . cannot remedy every wrong."9'
An expansion of emotion-based damages would harm veterinarians,
manufacturers of medicines for animals, boarding stables, rescue groups,
other animal-industry services providers, and ultimately animals
themselves. The "unintended consequences" of larger liability insurance
costs could portend a reduction in quality of veterinary care for animals
resulting from reduced demand due to increased fees; a decline in animal
health research and development; and a reduction in demand for most or all
animal-related goods and services due to increased costs which would be
passed on to consumers.9 2 Such a dramatic expansion of damages might
86 William C. Root, "Man's Best Friend": Property or Family Member? An Examination of
the Legal Classification of Companion Animals and Its Impact on Damages Recoverable for Their
Wrongful Death or Injury, 47 VILL. L. REv. 423, 435-41 (2002); Sonia S. Waisman & Barbara R.
Newell, Recovery of "Non-Economic" Damages for Wrongful Killing or Injury of Companion Animals:
A Judicial and Legislative Trend, 7 ANIMAL L. 45, 46 (2001).
87 see JOHN HOLLAND, AN ANALYSIS OF FACTORS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DECLINE OF THE
HORSE INDUSTRY (2012), available at
http://www.equinewelfarealliance.org/uploads/Analysis of Factors Responsible for HorseIndustry
Decline.pdf (discussing the finding that low end horse had declined in value by 25.4 percent between
Spring 2004 and Spring 2010); Damages for Death or Injury of an Animal, ANIMAL LEGAL DEFENSE
FUND, http://aldf.org/article.php?id=244 (last visited May 10, 2013).
88 See Root, supra note 86, 441-46 (arguing that an increase in the number veterinary
malpractice suits might be a positive social development); see also Diamond, supra note 85, at 151-63.
89 See Diamond, supra note 85, at 151-63.
9o Hankin, supra note 1, at 399-409.
9' Strickland v. Medlen, 397 S.W.3d 184, 197 (Tex. 2013).
92 Non-Economic Damages in Pet Litigation, supra note 3, at 260-67; Richard L. Cupp, Jr.,
Barking Up the Wrong Tree, L.A. TIMES (June 22, 1998),
http://articles.latimes.com/1998/jun/22/local/me-62429; see also Richard L. Cupp Jr., A Dubious Grail:
Seeking Tort Law Expansion and Limited Personhood as Stepping Stones Toward Abolishing Animals'
Property Status, 60 SMU L. REv. 3, 34-54 (2007).
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ultimately have a ripple effect beyond animal-related industries as well.
Various insurance groups have cautioned that the cost of ordinary
homeowners' and motor vehicle insurance policies could also negatively
impact the affordability and availability of insurance for consumers.93
Additionally, allowing non-economic or emotion-based damages in
negligence suits involving animals presents practical problems from a
judicial standpoint. First, it is difficult to define the humans that are entitled
to recover. Consider a hypothetical family dog, the daily companion of a
child, who was initially purchased by the boy's father, and is fed and
walked by the boy's mother. Neither the owner of record nor the primary
caretaker adequately identifies the human who shares the greatest bond of
companionship with this dog. It is also difficult to identify the class of
animals for which a pet owner may recover. Humans form a bond with an
infinite number of other living creatures. What if the family owned and
treasured an unusual pet instead of a dog? Should emotional damages be
allowed for birds, reptiles, fish, and tarantulas? 94
In addition to the difficulty in defining owners and pets, the court
system is presented with other challenges. First, the potential financial
burden placed on the defendant would be unwarranted in cases of ordinary
negligence. In the Nichols case cited supra, the Iowa Supreme Court held
that the owner of a toy poodle killed by a kennel owner's dog was not
entitled to recover emotional damages for the loss of the dog.95 At trial, the
owner's expert testified that the pet's value was whatever the owner thinks
it is and could be "as high as the national debt."9 6 The plaintiffs claims
were eventually dismissed, but this illustrates the difficulty in quantifying
the sentimental or emotional value of a companion animal and the risk that
a negligent tortfeasor would be exposed to extraordinary and unforeseeable
damage claims.
Second, the unwieldy legal problems that accompany allowing
sentimental and companionship damage claims for pets will certainly invite
gamesmanship. 7 For "valuable" animals such as a show horse with an
established market value of $50,000, property law damages principles in all
jurisdictions dictate that the owners' maximum recovery would be$50,000.
If sentimental value damages for companion animals with little or no
market value are in fact allowed, the show horse's owner might argue that
the horse is a "worthless," but beloved, companion animal in hopes of
recovering unlimited emotion-based damages.
93 Strickland v. Medlen, 397 S.W.3d 184, 194 (Tex. 2013).
94 See Rabideau v. City of Racine, 627 N.W.2d 795, 802 (Wis. 2001) (discussing the
difficulties involved in creating a bright line rule in this realm).
95 Nichols v. Sukaro Kennels, 555 N.W.2d 689, 691 (Iowa 1996).
96 Id. at 690.
9 Strickland v. Medlen, 397 S.W.3d 184, 196 (Tex. 2013).
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In addition to the application challenges, expanding emotion-based
damages to include pets would be against public policy. It would be
incongruous to allow owners to recover the loss of a pet's companionship
or the emotional bond that the owner has with the pet when similar
recovery is not available for a variety of loved human beings. It would be
odd if the law "permitted damages for loss of a Saint Bernard but not a
brother Bernard." 9 8
Virtually all the courts in the United States agree that because of
the serious public policy questions, such an expansion of the law should be
left to the legislature to evaluate and implement after carefully weighing the
potential costs and benefits to the public. However, as discussed above,
legislatively-defined parameters and caps on non-economic damages in
companion animal negligence cases would be a "slippery slope" and should
ultimately be avoided.
TABLE 1.
STATES REFUSING NON-ECONOMIC DAMAGES IN ORDINARY NEGLIGENCE
CASES INVOLVING ANIMALS
The majority of states refuse to recognize a damages claim for an owner's
emotional attachment to a companion animal when the animal has been
negligently lost or destroyed.
State Case Facts Court's Holding
Alaska See Mitchell v. Defendant No damages for the dog's
Heinrichs, landowner shot sentimental and
27 P.3d 309, and killed a pet emotional value to owner.
314 dog on her
(Alaska 2001). property.
Ariz. See Kaufman v. Veterinary No award for damages for
Langhofer, 222 malpractice claim emotional distress or loss
P.3d 272, 279 where negligence of companionship with
(Ariz. Ct. App. resulted in the pet negligently injured or
2009). death of a bird. killed.
Cal. See McMahon Veterinary No award for damages
v. Craig, 97 malpractice claim based on dog's
Cal. Rptr. 3d where negligence sentimental value to
555, 568 (Cal. resulted in the
9 Id. at 192.
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Ct. App. 2009). death of a dog. owner.
Conn. See Myers v. Defendant animal Noneconomic damages
City of control officer are not recoverable for
Hartford, 853 negligently negligent or intentional
A.2d 621, 626 destroyed pet dog. act resulting in death of
(Conn. App. Ct. pet.
2004).
Del. See Naples v. Dog fight on No damages for
Miller, 2009 plaintiffs emotional distress and
WL 1163504, at property in which mental anguish resulting
*3-4 (Del. the defendant's from witnessing damage
Super. Ct. Apr. unrestrained dog to dog, which is property.
30, 2009), aff'd, caused significant
992 A.2d 1237 injury to
(Del. 2010). plaintiff s dog.
Compare
Kennedy v.
Byas, 867 So.2d
1195, 1198
(Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2004).
with
Johnson v.
Wander, 592
So.2d 1225
(Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1992).
Veterinary
malpractice claim
where alleged
veterinary
malpractice
caused the
plaintiff dog
owner emotional
distress.
Veterinary
malpractice claim
where alleged
veterinary
malpractice
caused the
plaintiff dog
owner emotional
distress.
The Impact Rule
precluded a dog owner
from recovering damages
for emotional distress
because physical impact
is a prerequisite for
emotional distress
damages.
Partial summary
judgment striking the
claims for punitive
damages and emotional
distress was
improvidently granted
because a jury questions
exists
Fla.
Ga. See Holbrook v. Defendant's dog Impact Rule prevented
Stansell, 562 allegedly attacked the grandmother from
S.E.2d 731,733 a newborn foal, recovering emotional
2012-2013] 265
KY. J. EQUINE, AGRI., & NAT. RESOURCES L. [Vol. 5 No. 2
(Ga. Ct. App. resulting in distress damages.
2002). injuries so severe
that the foal had
to be euthanized.
Grandmother of
the foal's owner
witnessed the
alleged attack.
Idaho See Gill v. Defendant shot Mental anguish damages
Brown, 695 and killed are not recoverable on
P.2d 1276, 1277 plaintiff's donkey, negligent infliction of
(Idaho Ct. App. but plaintiffs did emotional distress claim;
1985). not sustain any different result for
physical injury, intentional infliction of
emotional distress claim.
Ind. See Lachenman Plaintiff dog The dog owner's
v. Stice, 838 owner witnessed witnessing the death of
N.E.2d 451, the death of his his dog was insufficient
467-8 (In. Ct. dog, fatally to support a claim for
App. 2006), attacked by a negligent infliction of
trans. denied, neighbor's dog. emotional distress; the
855 N.E.2d sentimental value
1008 (Ind. measure allowed in
2006). heirloom cases does not
apply to dogs.
Iowa See Nichols v. Dog negligently Owner was unable to
Sukaro injured while recover damages for
Kennels, 555 staying at mental distress based on
N.W.2d 689, boarding kennel. his sentimental
691 (Iowa attachment to dog.
1996).
Kan. See Burgess v. Dog negligently Sentimental value is not
Shampooch Pet injured by recoverable.
Indus., Inc., 131 groomer.
P.3d 1248, 1251
(Kan. Ct. App.
2006).
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Ky. See Ammon v. Unrestrained Family could not recover
Welty, 113 family dog was for loss of consortium
S.W.3d 185, impounded and because a dog is personal
187-8 (Ky. Ct. destroyed by dog property, for which loss
App. 2003). warden. of love and affection is
not compensable.
La. See Kling v. Fatal dog fight Although the court
U.S. Fire Ins. resulting in the awarded damages based
Co., 146 So.2d loss of the on the market value for
635, 642 (La. plaintiff s dog. the loss of the dog, the
Ct. App. 1962), court found personal or
overruled on sentimental
other grounds considerations could not
by Holland v. be considered in
Buckley, 305 determining damages.
So.2d 113 (La.
1974),
superseded by
statute as stated
in Pepper v.
Triplet, 864
So.2d 181 (La.
2004).
Mass. See Krasnecky Defendant's dog Owners were not able to
v. Meffen, 777 killed seven sheep recover damages for
N.E.2d 1286, that were emotional distress or loss
1290 (Mass. considered of companionship for
App. Ct. 2002). "companion their sheep.
animals" by
owners.
Mich. See Koester v. Veterinary Dog owner could not
VGA Animal malpractice claim recover for pain and
Hosp., 624 where negligence suffering, extreme fright,
N.W.2d 209, resulted in the mortification, and loss of
211-12 (Mich. death of a dog. companionship.
Ct. App. 2000).
Minn. See Soucek v. Dog shot by Dog owner had no
Banham, 503 police, recoverable claim for
N.W.2d 153, negligent infliction of
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164 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1993).
See also Soucek
v. Banham, 524
N.W.2d 478,
481 (Minn. Ct.
App.1994).
Dog shot by
police.
emotional distress
because officers did not
know the identity of
owner and malicious
conduct was not directed
at the owner.
Dog owner's
compensatory damages
were limited to the fair
market value of animal;
the dog owner could not
recover punitive damages
for intentional shooting
death of dog.
Miss. See Wright v. Plaintiffs sought Plaintiffs could not
Edison, 619 future damages recover future damages;
S.W.2d 797, because of alleged the measure of damages
801-2 (Mo. Ct. nervousness of is the difference between
App. 1981). pet cats made the cats' fair market value
nervous by the before and after the
defendant's alleged injury.
conduct.
Neb. See Fackler v. Veterinarian's Owners of racehorses
Genetzky, 595 alleged could not recover
NW.2d 884, negligence damages for their
891-2 (Neb. allegedly caused emotional distress.
1999). the death of two
racehorses.
Nev. See Thomson v. Dog euthanized Owner unable to recover
Lied Animal without owner's damages for emotional
Shelter, 2009 consent. distress because owner
WL 3303733, did not show sufficient
*8,* 1b (D. Nev. evidence of extreme and
Oct. 14, 2009). outrageous conduct, the
owner did not witness
tortious conduct, and the
dog was not in the class
of human relatives for
whom such damages are
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available.
N.J. See Harabes v. Dog died Dog owners were unable
The Barkery, following to recover damages for
791 A.2d 1142, groomer's alleged emotional distress and
1145-6 (N.J. negligence. loss of companionship
Super. Ct. App. because of public policy
Div. 2001). considerations.
N.M. See Wilcox v. Druggist's Sentimental value
Butt's Drug negligence in damages for a dog are not
Stores, Inc., 35 substituting pills recoverable.
P.2d 978, 979 harmful to dogs
(N.M. 1934). for harmless pills
owner ordered
resulted in death
of dog.
N.Y. See DeJoy v. Horses were Horse owners are unable
Niagara electrocuted when to recover damages for
Mohawk Power defendant's wires either loss of
Corp., 786 fell on their fence. companionship or
N.Y.S.2d 873, emotional distress.
873 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2004).
N.C. See Shera v. Veterinary The emotional bond
N.C. State malpractice claim owners had with their dog
Univ. where negligence is not recognized as
Veterinary resulted in the compensable under state
Teaching Hosp., death of a dog. law.
723 S.E.2d 352,
356-7 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2012).
Ohio See Veterinary Dog owners could not
Oberschlake v. malpractice claim recover for emotional
Veterinary where negligence distress and loss of
Assoc. Animal resulted in injury companionship caused by
Hosp., 785 to a dog. veterinarian's negligence.
N.E.2d 811, 814
(Ohio Ct. App.
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2003).
Or. See Lockett v. Defendant was Cat owners were not
Hill, 51 P.3d 5, found negligent in entitled to recover on
6-8 (Or. Ct. keeping their claim of negligent
App. 2002). dangerous dogs, infliction of emotional
which killed distress absent a showing
plaintiffs' cat. that dog owner's negligent
conduct interfered with an
interest that was protected
by something beyond
negligence law.
Pa. See Daughen v. Veterinary Under no circumstances
Fox, 539 A.2d malpractice claim could owners recover for
858, 865 (Pa. where negligence loss of companionship for
Super. Ct. resulted in the death of dog
1988), appeal death of a dog.
denied, 553
A.2d 967 (Pa.
1988).
R.I. See Rowbothanm Plaintiffs dog Plaintiff could not recover
v. Maher, 658 was killed by two damages for emotional
A.2d 912, 913 other dogs. trauma or support a claim
(R.I. 1995). for negligent infliction of
emotional distress.
S.C. See Bales v. Dog fight resulted State law does not
Judelsohn, 2005 in injuries to support a cause of action
UP 509, 509 plaintiffs dog. for emotional distress for
(S.C. Ct. App. injury to dog; lost wages
2005).9i resulting from injury to
an animal is not
actionable because a dog
is considered personal
property; limited the
judgment to
reimbursement for
at"Available
http://www.judicial.state.sc.us/opinions/displayUnPubOpinion.cfin?caseNo=2005-UP-509.
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See Strickland
v. Medlen, No.
12-0047, 2013
WL 1366033
(Tex. Apr. 5,
2013).
Death of family
dog due to
negligence.
veterinary expenses.
Damages for loss of
companionship or
emotional harm are not
recoverable; damages are
limited to the "special or
pecuniary value" linked
to dog's "usefulness and
services," excluding
companionship or value
derived from an owner's
emotional attachment to
an animal.
Vt. See Goodby v. Alleged Loss of companionship
Vetpharm, Inc., veterinary and emotional distress
974 A.2d 1269, malpractice damages were
1271 (Vt. resulted in the unavailable.
2009). death of two cats.
Va. See Kondaurov Motorist and her Motorist could not
v. Kerdasha, dog were both recover damages for
629 S.E.2d 181 injured when her emotional distress or
(Va. 2006). vehicle was rear- mental anguish because
ended by a bus. of her concern for injuries
sustained by her dog.
Wash. See Sherman v. Veterinary stating that a dog owner
Kissinger, 195 malpractice claim has no right to emotional
P.3d 539, 548 where negligence distress damages or
(Wash. Ct. App. resulted in the damages for loss of
2008). death of a dog. human-animal bond
based on negligent death
or injury to dog
W. Va. See Carbasho v. Dog owner and Damages for sentimental
Musulin, 618 her dog were both value, mental suffering,
S.E.2d 368, 371 struck by and emotional distress not
(W. Va. 2005). defendant's car; recoverable.
dog died as a
result of
defendant's
Tex.
2012-2013] 271
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negligence.
Wis. See Rabideau v. Owner watched a Owner was not related to
City of Racine, police officer the victim as spouse,
627 N.W.2d shoot and kill her parent-child, grandparent-
795, 798 (Wis. companion dog. grandchild, or sibling, as
2001). was required to bring a
claim for damages based
upon the tort of negligent
infliction of emotional
distress.
To the author's knowledge, there are no reported court rulings on the issue
of the recoverability of emotion-based damages for a companion animal in
Alabama, Colorado, the District of Columbia, Maine, Montana, New
Hampshire, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming
as of the date this article was submitted for publication.
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